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1. Folk Psychological Practice
Psychologically normal adult humans make sense of intentional
actions by trying to decide for which reason they were performed.
This is a datum that requires our understanding. Although there
have been interesting recent debates about how we should
understand ‘reasons’, I will follow a long tradition and assume that,
at a bare minimum, to act for a reason involves having appropriately
interrelated beliefs and desires.
He left the party because he believed the host had insulted him.
She will head for the cabin in the woods because she wants peace
and quiet. These are typical examples of reason explanations, one
backward looking and the other future facing. Both imply more
than they say. To leave a party because of a suspected insult
suggests that one desires not to be insulted, or at least it implies
that the desire to avoid insult is stronger than that for some other
good on offer. Similarly, to seek tranquillity in an isolated cabin
implies that one believes that it can be found there, or at least more
so than elsewhere. Despite the fact that the situations and
characters involved in these dramas are woefully under-described,
we are able to ‘make sense’ of these actions in a basic manner using
the belief/desire schema. This involves designating a particular
pairing of a belief and a desire, each with its own specified
propositional content, in a way that rests on a quiet understanding
of the way propositional attitudes inter-relate.
To understand which beliefs and desires were responsible for a
person’s action is normally only to understand why they acted in a
quite skeletal way. Maximally, to understand why someone acted
requires a more or less detailed description of his or her
circumstances, other propositional attitudes (hopes, fears), more
basic perceptions and emotions and perhaps even his or her
character, current situation and history. In short, to fully grasp why
someone took action on a particular occasion requires relating that
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person’s ‘story’. While I think this richer understanding of what it
is to act for reasons is important, my primary interest is to better
understand how we acquire and apply our understanding of ‘folk
psychology’ more minimally construed.1 I am interested in how we
become skilled at the practice of predicting, explaining and
explicating actions by appeal to reasons of the sort that minimally
have belief/desire pairings at their core. To keep things straight, let
us call this folk psychology stricto sensu.
It is a commonplace in Anglophone philosophy that adult
humans make regular and reliable use of ‘folk pyschology’, so
understood. Some maintain this fuels even our most basic
encounters with others in daily life and that a great many of our
social institutions depend upon it. In promoting these ideas, many
so-called friends of folk psychology have overstated and misunder-
stood its role in social cognition and our lives more generally. First,
they typically see it as more basic and far more pervasive than it is.
We have many other—more basic, both phylogenetically and
ontogenetically—means of conducting social coordinations, inter-
actions and engagements. These yield neither predictions nor
explanations per se but instead involve recognition-response
patterns that generate ‘embodied expectations’. In ‘normal’
contexts these are not only quicker but also far more powerful and
reliable ways of relating to others and navigating social dynamics.2
It is therefore false to say that without a capacity for folk
psychology we would be bereft of any reliable means of interacting
1 Some prefer to talk of ‘commonsense psychology’ as opposed to ‘folk
psychology’, because the latter label was pejoratively fashioned by the
enemies of this practice in order to highlight its weak scientific
credentials. Calling it ‘folk’ psychology was meant to signal that its tenets
are outmoded, limited and backward—i.e. to highlight the fact that it is
indeed ‘folksy’. However, since I do not think this folk practice can be
usefully compared with the promises of a scientific psychology, I am
happy to defend the vulgar on this (see D. D. Hutto, The Presence of Mind
(Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1999)).
2 See D. D. Hutto, ‘The Limits of Spectatorial Folk Psychology’,
Mind and Language 19, 2004, 548–73; D. D. Hutto, ‘Unprincipled
Engagements: Emotional Experience, Expression and Response’, Radical
Enactivism: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto, R. Menary (ed.)
(Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2006). See also H. De
Jaegher, Social Interaction Rhythm and Participatory Sense-Making: An
Embodied, Interactional Approach to Social Understanding, with Some
Implications for Autism (Brighton, University of Sussex, 2006), unpub-
lished DPhil thesis.
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with others. Nor do we call on it that often.3 Many of our routine
encounters with others take place in situations in which the social
roles and rules are well established, so much so that unless we
behave in a deviant manner we typically have no need to
understand one another by means of the belief/desire schema.4
More often than not we neither predict nor seek to explain the
actions of others in terms of their unique beliefs and desires at all.
That said, sometimes the actions of others cry out for
explanation—sometimes they violate norms (or appear to do so) in
ways that we can only make sense of by understanding them in a
wider context; by acquiring the narrative that fills in or fleshes out
the particular details of that person’s story. Any account that has as
its subject matter the reason why a person acted on a particular
occasion (as restrictively defined above) I will call a folk
psychological narrative.5 The practice of supplying such narratives
just is that of explicating and explaining action in terms of
reasons—the application of the belief/desire framework. Folk
psychology is thus, in essence, a peculiar kind of narrative practice.
Folk psychological narratives come in both third-personal and
second-personal varieties. This is important since the success or
otherwise of such explanations depends mainly on who is doing the
telling—i.e. who produces the account. Although we often attempt
to generate such accounts on behalf of others, even when this
speculative activity is well supported—say, by simulative or
theoretical heuristics—it is quite unlikely that such attempts will
3 S. Gallagher, ‘The Practice of Mind: Theory, Simulation or Primary
Interaction?’ Journal of Consciousness Studies 8, No. 5–7, 2001, 83–108.
4 J. Bruner, Acts of Meaning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1990); J. Bermúdez, ‘The Domain of Folk Psychology’, Minds and
Persons, A. O’Hear (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
5 We might also call these ‘people-narratives’; for they are ‘narratives
in which people feature as people (and not, for example, as objects for
scientific investigation), the narrative should also present what happened
in a way that enables the audience or the reader to make sense of the
thoughts, feelings, and actions of those people who are internal to the
narrative’ (P. Goldie, On Personality (London: Routledge, 2004), 115). For
expositional variety, I use these terms interchangeably. Of course, this
presupposes the uncontentious idea that there are different types of
narratives and that these can be classified by their content and subject
matter.
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succeed in hitting on the ‘right’ explanation. Indeed, it seems that
the likelihood of success is more or less inversely proportional to
need.6
Although hardly foolproof, by far the best and most reliable
means of obtaining a true understanding of why another has acted
is to get the relevant story directly from the horse’s mouth. The
activity is familiar enough. Such accounts are typically delivered—
indeed, fashioned—in the course of ordinary dialogue and
conversation. It is because of this that they are usually sensitive to a
questioner’s precise explanatory needs and requirements. The
nature of such engagements is complex and deserves greater
attention than it has received to date, but that is not my focus here.
So far, all I want to draw attention to is the banal truism that
second-person deliveries of these folk psychological narratives do
much of the heavy lifting in enabling us to make sense of the
actions of others in daily life—i.e. when there is a need to do so.
While I suspect that we may use folk psychology far less
frequently and less reliably than is generally supposed by its
friends, folk psychological practice is important and our capacity to
engage in it warrants explanation. The above observations,
however, should immediately raise doubts about the credibility of
the favoured hypotheses about its ultimate origins. Orthodoxy has
it that our ‘theory of mind’ abilities are the consequence of the
hard work of subpersonal mechanisms. And, although there is
much debate about the precise character of the latter, these devices
are typically thought to be a kind of native cognitive endowment,
gifted to us by our evolutionary forefathers.
In light of the above and on close scrutiny, it seems quite unlikely
that this ability was the ancient solution to an adaptive problem that
arose for our ancestors during the Pleistocene epoch, enabling ‘the
rapid comprehension and prediction of another organism’s
behaviour’.7 Third-personal mindreading involving the attribution
of interlaced propositional attitudes would have been unnecessary
for oiling our primary forms of social interaction and even for
sophisticated activities such as lexicon formation and language
6 see Hutto, 2004, op. cit. note 4.
7 S. Baron-Cohen, Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of
Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 12.
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learning.8 Moreover, if speculative uses of folk psychology to
determine why someone acted are as unreliable as I have claimed, it
seems quite unlikely that the folk psychological framework was
originally put in place to provide our ancestors with a powerful
predictive-explanatory tool, as it is so often claimed. In this light,
we would do well to rethink the role and function of folk
psychological ‘explanations’ in our lives, since their main job is not
to generate third-party speculations about what others are likely to
think or do or why they acted as they did. This is no way
diminishes—indeed it may well enhance—our understanding of the
importance of folk psychology and its place in our lives and other
practices.
In what follows, I promote the view that our childhood
engagement with narratives of certain kinds is the basis of these
sophisticated abilities—i.e. it is through such socially scaffolded
means that folk psychological skills are normally acquired and
fostered. Undeniably, we often use our folk psychological apparatus
in speculating about why another may have acted on a particular
occasion, but this is at best a peripheral and parasitic use. Our
primary understanding and skill in folk psychology derives from and
has its primary application in special kinds of second-personal
engagements.
It is possible to explain how budding folk psychologists come by
a practical grasp of the core folk psychological concepts, as well as
the ability to structurally represent how these propositional
attitudes normally relate, schematically without postulating any
inherited hard-wired ‘theory of mind’ mechanisms.9 A distinct
kind of narrative practice, one involving particular kinds of story,
engenders folk psychology abilities in the normal populace (of
certain cultures, at least). Encounters with narratives about those
who act for reasons best explain the origins of folk psychological
8 See D. D. Hutto, ‘First Communions: Mimetic Sharing without
Theory of Mind’, The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity, J.
Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha and E. Itkonen (eds.) (Amsterdam/
Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2007).
9 In what follows, I will be presupposing that the children in question
already have a basic practical grasp of the core concepts of belief and
desire. I provide a more detailed account of how they come by these in
other writings. I also argue that no existing version of theory-theory or
simulation theory can better explain the origin of the core metarepresen-
tational concept of belief in particular. See D. D. Hutto, Folk Psychological
Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, forthcoming).
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abilities, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. Such stories
familiarise us with the forms and norms of folk psychology. This is
the core claim of the Narrative Practice Hypothesis (or NPH). The
aim of this paper is to introduce this proposal and to make a prima
facie case for its acceptance.
2. What does it take to be a Folk Psychologist?
Not everyone has what it takes to be a folk psychologist. The birds
and the bees don’t do it; chimps don’t do it. Even little kids don’t
do it! This should not surprise us. Folk psychology isn’t easy—it is
a quite sophisticated skill. Mastery of it rests on having met a
number of pre-requisites. At the very least, one has to have:
(i) a practical understanding of the propositional attitudes;
(ii) a capacity to represent the objects that these take—
propositional contents as specified by that-clauses;
(iii) an understanding of the ‘principles’ governing the interaction
of the attitudes, both with one another and with other key
psychological players (such as perception and emotion);
(iv) an ability to apply all of the above sensitively (i.e. adjusting for
relevant differences in particular cases by making allowances
for a range of variables such as the person’s character,
circumstances, etc.).
Any interesting explication of folk psychology should not only say
what having this rich set of abilities entails, it should also say how it
is acquired. On the assumption that these abilities do not come as a
‘package deal’, I will focus on providing an acquisitional account of
(iii) and (iv) in terms of children’s engagement in a special kind of
narrative practice. This is of interest since, contrary to their
advertisements, the rival offerings—theory theory and simulation
theory—do not provide any deep understanding of (iii). All the
existing theories presuppose some kind of commerce with folk
psychological principles, whether this is imagined to take the form
of a tacit or explicit theoretical understanding or a practical
capacity to manipulate one’s own mental states in accord with them
(thus, quite literally, embodying them). But presupposing the
existence of such abilities is not the same as adequately explaining
how they first came to be in place. Ultimately, I think it can be
demonstrated that the existing theories do not meet this
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explanatory demand.10 Yet, worse than this, as far as I can see, they
do not trouble themselves with giving an account of (iv) at all.
Before getting started, it is worth saying a few words about what
distinguishes what it is to have an understanding of desires, beliefs
(and even desires and beliefs) from what it is to have an
understanding of reasons. Doing so will help us to properly
characterise our true quarry. It is empirically well established that
children make some propositional attitude ascriptions before they
learn to explicate, explain or predict actions in terms of reasons.
For example, at around two years of age, children are in secure
possession of ‘an early intentional understanding of persons having
internal goals and wants that differ from person to person’.11 The
two-year-old’s understanding of desires can be rather sophisti-
cated: children understand, for example, how desires relate to
emotions and perceptions and what would relevantly and consist-
ently satisfy specific desires—thus they exhibit some fluency with
counterfactual thinking of a limited sort.
As impressive as this is, it goes without saying that these abilities
do not equate to an understanding of beliefs. Nor would an
understanding of desires and beliefs conjunctively equate to an
understanding of reasons. These are all logically distinct abilities.
We can see the main point at issue if we consider that for a great
many coordinating purposes it is often enough to know simply what
it is that McX likes or wants. Young children are certainly capable
of noting this sort of thing and making good use of it—it is what
enables them to make certain low-level, inductively driven
predictions about what others are likely to do. But this capacity in
itself is quite different from understanding why McX might have
acted for a reason. More is needed for that—in particular, the child
would have to be able to understand that McX’s action issued from
a complex ‘state of mind’, one having a particular kind of implicit
structure. Said structure is what one alludes to when one says McX
not only likes yoghurt but is eating it for breakfast because he
believes it will make him healthy—implying, of course, that good
health is also something he seeks.
10 Ibid.
11 H. Wellman, A. Phillips, ‘Developing Intentional Understandings’,
Intentions and Intentionality, B. Malle, L. J. Moses and D. A. Baldwin
(eds.) (Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press, 2001), 130; K. Bartsch and H.
Wellman, Children Talk About the Mind (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995), chapter 4.
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I mention this because while it is quite unlikely that anyone
would confuse the ability to understand and attribute desires with
that of being able to understand and attribute beliefs, there is a
fairly widespread tendency to conflate the latter sort of ability with
a capacity to understand and attribute reasons. This mistake stems
from assuming, as is commonly done, that children are already in
the possession of the bulk of their theory of mind at the point at
which they begin to pass false belief tests. Hence, success on these
tests is taken to be the mark of their having acquired the final piece
of the ‘theory of mind’ puzzle. Having mastered the core concept
of belief, it is supposed that they have mastered the full set of folk
psychological principles.
But if we give due consideration to what false belief tests actually
test there is reason to doubt this. In the original version of the false
belief test, of which there are now many well-known variants,
children were introduced to a puppet, Maxi.12 The test was
conducted in a room in which a pile of biscuits was the main
attraction. In the course of events, Maxi, like the children, observes
as the biscuits are put in one of two cupboards. The puppet
subsequently leaves the room and during his absence the children
watch as an experimenter moves the biscuits into the other
cupboard. The question they are asked is: where will Maxi think
the biscuits are on his return? For anyone with a sound grasp of the
concept of belief, and how perception fixes belief, answering this
ought to be straightforward. But, famously, for some—children
below a certain age and those with specific impairments—it is not.
Such children have difficulty in ascribing the Maxi-puppet a
belief which differs from their own belief about the location of the
biscuits. They are unable to ascribe the puppet a false belief, or so it
seems. The reason for this is, it has been plausibly suggested, that
they are unable to understand that the puppet (or anyone) has a
cognitive take on the facts that diverges from their own. Younger
children and those with infantile autism cannot simultaneously
represent how they take things to stand with the world (from their
point of view) and also how things stand from another cognitive
vantage point. Thus, in lacking an ability to ascribe false beliefs
they demonstrate a lack of an understanding of belief, if we
suppose, as we ought, that grasping that concept requires having a
metarepresentational ability.
12 H. Wimmer and J. Perner, ‘Beliefs about Beliefs: Representation
and Constraining Function of Wrong Beliefs in Young Children’s
Understanding of Deception’, Cognition 12, 1983, 103–128.
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If we stick to the evidence and put aside any prior attachment to
theory theory for a moment, it is quite clear that merely having
demonstrable metarepresentational abilities—i.e. showing com-
mand of the concept of belief—is not equivalent to understanding
reasons per se. It is easy to be misled on this score due to the great
emphasis that developmental psychologists place on the moment
when children begin to pass false belief tasks. As noted above, these
are often called ‘Theory of Mind’ tests but in fact, just as their
name suggests, they only test for an explicit understanding of false
belief and nothing more. To call them ‘Theory of Mind’ tests
therefore gives a quite erroneous impression, which trades on the
assumption that folk psychological abilities simply fall into place
automatically once children master the application of the concept
of belief. This is simply untrue. Knowing that children manage to
pass false-belief tests, reliably enough, at a certain age under very
particular experimental conditions, gives no insight into the extent
of their understanding of that concept in other contexts. This being
the case, such tests certainly do not tell us about the general
abilities of children to ascribe or understand reasons, per se.
The myopia associated with conducting and analysing ‘false
belief tests’ has tended to blind researchers to the fact that
children’s nuanced folk psychological skills only develop securely
after ages 4 and 5. Thus, ‘Proponents of the dominant theories have
been notably quiet about what happens in development after the
child’s fifth birthday. However research that explores whether
5-year-olds can use simple false belief knowledge to make
inferences about their own and other’s perspectives finds that they
singularly fail to do so’.13 Apparently, it takes some time for them to
incorporate their newfound understanding of belief within wider
explanatory strategies.
The simple truth, as I said, is that having an understanding of
belief is logically distinct from having an understanding of what it
is to act for a reason. One can ascribe beliefs using a simple
inference rule of the following sort: if McX says (or sincerely
asserts) that P then McX believes that P (ceteris paribus). Knowing
that McX believes that P is useful for at least some social
coordination purposes—for example, it enables one to predict what
else McX might believe. This might be achieved by focusing on
13 J. I. M. Carpendale and C. Lewis, ‘Constructing an Understanding
of the Mind: The Development of Children’s Social Understanding
within Social Interaction’, Behavioural and Brain Sciences 27, No. 1, 2004,
79–151, 91.
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what McX ought to conclude from thinking that P (on the
assumption that X observes standard norms of rationality). Very
well, but this does not equate to ascribing X a reason: that would
require ascribing to X a complex state of mind, minimally
consisting of a belief/desire pair with interlocking contents.
Reasons are not to be confused with isolated thoughts or desires.
To think of an action as performed for a reason it is not enough to
imagine it as being sponsored by a singular kind of propositional
attitude; one must also ascribe other kinds of attitudes which act as
relevant and necessary partners in motivational crime.
This is not always evident given the way reason explanations are
often presented. As noted before, they are generally truncated. But
what I have sought to emphasize is that having a discrete
understanding of the core propositional attitudes—belief and
desire—is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for being a
practising folk psychologist. Having issued that reminder, we can
now turn to the main event.
3. Acquiring Folk Psychology in ontogeny
How, during childhood, do we come by our everyday folk
psychological skills and understanding? This familiar achievement
rests on a complex series of foundations—i.e. children must already
have a number of more basic imaginative abilities and interpersonal
skills in order to learn how to make sense of actions in terms of
reasons successfully. Long before they are able to do this, they are at
home in navigating their social worlds in embodied and imaginative
ways: they get by in the earliest stages of their interpersonal careers
without ever attributing desires, beliefs, or reasons to anyone. In
time, they get a practical grasp on the different kinds of
propositional attitudes—learning about each in discrete stages, as
their command of language and its syntactic constructions grows. I
have elsewhere argued at length that there is good reason to think
that children come into the possession of all the pieces needed for
playing the understanding-action-in-terms-of-reasons game before
they can actually play it.14 What they are missing in their early
years, if I am right, is not the components needed to play this
game: they lack knowledge of the basic rules for doing so.
For, as noted in the previous section, proficiency in making
isolated propositional attitude ascriptions—attributing certain
14 Hutto, ibid.
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goals, desires, thoughts and beliefs—is not the same as knowing how
these combine to become reasons. This stronger condition must be
satisfied if one is to be a folk psychologist. This requires mastery of
the norms governing the interplay between these attitudes. What
children are missing, even upon acquiring a practical grasp of the
concept of belief, is not therefore another ingredient needed for
baking the folk psychological cake—rather it is the instructions for
mixing all the ingredients properly to make many such cakes. But if
the instructions for this are not built into their minds, how exactly
might they be acquired?
The Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH) claims that children
normally achieve this understanding by engaging in story-tellling
practices, with the support of others. The stories about those who
act for reasons—i.e. folk psychological narratives—are the foci of
this practice. Stories of this special kind provide the crucial
training set needed for understanding reasons. They do this by
serving as exemplars, having precisely the right features to foster an
understanding of the forms and norms of folk psychology. By
participating in this kind of narrative practice children become
familiar with the way the core propositional attitudes, minimally
belief and desire, behave with respect to each other and their
familiar partners: emotions, perceptions, etc. More than this, in
such stories a person’s reasons are shown in situ; against
appropriate backdrops and settings. For example, children learn
how a person’s reasons can be influenced by such things as their
character, history, current circumstances and larger projects.
It is because they have just these features that folk psychological
narratives as well as the fact that they are complex objects of
mutual attention can play this crucial role. Most children are not
only repeatedly exposed to such stories, but normally this occurs in
a very rich setting, with engaged participants on both sides. It is
helpful to remind ourselves of this, lest we are swayed by
misguided poverty of the stimulus arguments into believing that
the postulation of inherited ‘theory of mind’ devices is unavoid-
able.15
15 Several philosophers have suggested that a Poverty of the Stimulus
Argument concerning the acquisition of folk psychology could be
developed that would parallel the version Chomsky developed in support
of his claims about the existence of innate linguistic knowledge, see P.
Carruthers, ‘Moderately Massive Modularity’, Minds and Persons, A.
O’Hear (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 71; G.
Botterill and P. Carruthers, The Philosophy of Psychology (Cambridge:
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The assumption behind that line of thought is that the
acquisition of folk psychology ‘poses the same degree of a
learnability problem as does the rapid acquisition of linguistic
skills, which appears to be similarly rapid, universal and without
sufficient stimulus from the environment’.16 Yet, with respect to
folk psychology, the argument has not been spelt out in any detail.
Any prima facie plausibility it has derives simply from the idea that
children could not possibly fashion the rich product that is folk
psychology by applying their general reasoning abilities in response
to impoverished stimuli. But this idea is only remotely credible if
we have in a mind a quite implausible picture of how children might
become aquainted with the rules of folk psychology in the first
place; to be sure they do not encounter these as set of serial
announcements issued by their parents. And, of course, acquiring
an understanding of folk psychology by means of participating in
narrative practices, with the support of others, is nothing like being
read off a set of explicit principles or rules to be committed to
memory. It is only if one has this second model in mind that it is
tempting to agree with Goldman that few children ‘have mothers
who utter [folk psychological] platitudes’.17
Engaging with narratives, and those of the folk psychological
variety in particular, is anything but a passive affair: a wide range of
emotive and imaginative abilities are typically brought into play.
For example, even to appreciate such stories children must be
initially capable, at least to some degree, of imaginative identifica-
tion with the characters of the story. And not only will they be
exercising their recreative imaginations in this way, they will also be
responding emotively, just as they do in basic social engagements,
such as joint attention. In this respect, ‘conversations about written
and oral stories are natural extensions of children’s earlier
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 52–3; J. A. Fodor, Psychosemantics
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 133; see also K. Sterelny, Thought in
a Hostile World (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 214).
16 S. Mithen, ‘Mind, Brain and Material Culture: An Archaeological
Perspective’, Evolution and the Modern Mind: Modularity, Language and
Meta-Cognition, P. Carruthers and A. Chamberlain (eds.) (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 490.
17 A. I. Goldman, ‘In Defense of the Simulation Theory’, Mind and
Language 7, 1992, 104–119, 107.
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experiences with the sharing of event structures’.18 It is therefore of
no surprise that young children’s first narrative encounters are with
picture books that only depict objects, emotions and actions—but
not reasons for actions. They slowly graduate to stories that
concentrate on the kinds of complex psychological attitudes of
characters; those who find themselves embedded in increasingly
complex social dramas.
But it is not just the content of such stories that matters.
Sophisticated demands are also placed on children in the course of
hearing, discussing and learning from them. Thus it is normal for
children to be directed by caregivers to attend to the thoughts,
desires, and feelings of story characters and these are often
explained to and contextualised for them. Throughout these
interactions children will be calling on a prior bit limited mastery of
mentalistic terms and concepts. Crucially, however, these are not
simply mentioned in story-telling practices, rather children are
prompted at crucial points to offer their own explanations; they are
invited to apply, demonstrate and extend their prior understanding.
For example, while reading stories it is typical for adults to press for
answers to questions such as: ‘Why do you think X did that?’.
Moreover, those who tell stories to young children generally go
beyond the strict text—using voices, enacting character responses,
and providing details that reveal or hint at the motivations and
rationales of characters. Such exchanges are a mix of dramatic
re-enactment, contextualisation, and exposure to further examples,
all of which prompt further requests from listeners and opportuni-
ties for correction from the story-tellers.19
In these guided encounters with such stories children come to see
the relations that hold between the various psychological
attitudes—crucially, but not exclusively, the focus is on beliefs and
desires. This is important because, as stressed above, not only must
children have an understanding of the core propositional attitudes,
they must also learn how these inter-relate. Thus the way beliefs
and desires conspire to motivate actions—which, in abstracto, we
18 N. R. Guajardo, A. Watson, ‘Narrative Discourse and Theory of
Mind Development’, The Journal of Genetic Psychology 163, 2002,
305–325, 307.
19 Also, this kind of interpersonal activity occurs at the right point in
the developmental schedule of most children, making it plausible that it
might form the basis of their folk psychological training. People-focused
conversations happen early on and story-telling activities of the relevant
sort are usually well under way by the time children reach the ages of
three and four.
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might think of as the folk psychological schema—is a constant
feature of these narratives. But this requires knowing not only how
they inter-relate with one another, but also how they do so with
other standard players in psychological dramas. In sum, these
comprise what we might think of as the ‘core principles’ of
intentional psychology.
According to the NPH these ‘princples’ are revealed to children
not as a series of rules but by showing them in action, through
narratives, in their normal contexts of operation. In this way,
narratives not only show which features are constant to folk
psychological explanation but also, importantly, what can vary in
such accounts—such as the particulars of what a person believes
and desires, how these attitudes can change over time and why, and
also how character, history, and other commitments might impinge
on why a person acts as they do. All of this is put on show. In this
way children learn which kinds of factors must be taken into
account and adjusted for when it comes to making sense of the
stories that others tell about the reasons why they acted, as well as
learning what needs mentioning when providing their own. It is in
this way and in this sense that children acquire an understanding of
the core structure of folk psychology, its governing norms, and
guidance on its practical application. This is not a process through
which children distil a set of general rules.
To understand the NPH aright, two senses of ‘narrative’ must be
distinguished—i.e. the narratives which are the third-personal
objects of focus, and the narratives through which these are
presented and shared—i.e. the acts of narration that constitute the
second-personal story-tellings. As an object, a narrative—the story
itself—might be spontaneous production, an autobiographical
account, a bit of gossip, or an established cultural artefact. Many of
the latter are texts of which there may be multiple versions—such
as Perrault’s ‘Little Red Riding Hood’ or its Grimm Brothers
variant ‘Little Red Cap’. Indeed, this is one of the best known folk
psychological narratives:
Little Red Riding Hood learns from the woodcutter that her
grandmother is sick. She wants to make her grandmother feel
better [she is a nice, caring child], and she thinks that a basket of
treats will help, so she brings such a basket through the woods to
her grandmother’s house [beliefs and desires lead to actions].
When she arrives there, she sees the wolf in her grandmother’s
bed, but she falsely believes that the wolf is her grandmother
[appearances can be deceiving]. When she realizes it is a wolf, she
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is frightened and runs away, because she knows wolves can hurt
people. The wolf, who indeed wants to eat her, leaps out of the
bed and runs after her trying to catch her.20
Tales of this sort are legion. This is not, I take it, in doubt,
although as yet I have no precise data on how many of these
children encounter in the normal course of their development; I
leave it to the reader to speculate about this. What matters is that
they are the best means of revealing how propositional attitudes
work together in motivating actions and indicating which other
factors might make a difference. Given their content, they have
precisely the right properties for this work.
Well crafted cultural artefacts, like the familiar fairy tale cited
above, are a secure medium of achieving this. They are amongst the
earliest forms of published fiction, typically deriving from orally
preserved folk tales. Yet any story that describes reasons for action,
even those related through casual conversations, has the potential to
do so, even if they are not as well-structured as the canonical texts
used in much pre-school story-telling. With this in mind it is
diffcult to imagine how to motivate a poverty of the stimulus
argument in this domain, since these narratives are regularly traded
in run-of-the-mill conversations. Indeed, it is through listening to
and participating in conversations about people and why they act
that children first hear propositional attitudes being discussed and
described, and it is likely that it is through this route that they learn
about the kind of objects these take—complex linguistic construc-
tions embedded in that-clauses. It is stories featuring people and
their reasons for acting—however these are conveyed—that familiar-
ise children with the folk psychological framework and practical
knowledge of how to apply it.
Children are not simply learning generalisations—i.e. mere soft
laws—about what people typically do; they are learning how to
apply the folk psychological framework.
Although I previously emphasised the imaginative identification
and emotional responding that characterises engagement in
narrative practice, it is also worth highlighting how straightforward
it would be for children to pick up the structural template of
means-end reasoning through such encounters. It is into this
framework that particular propositional attitudes, beliefs and
desires, are inserted, like arguments in place of variables—based on
20 A. Lillard, ‘Other Folk’s Theories of Mind and Behaviour’,
Psychological Science 8, 1997, 268–274, 268, emphases mine.
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what we learn (or are told) about why someone acted (or why we
speculate they may have acted). Similarity-based connectionist—
non-sentential—accounts of cognitive processing that trade in
stereotypes, prototypes and exemplars are well placed to explain the
working of the underlying mechanisms which might make this
possible. Picking all this up from narrative encounters would be
easy work for our pattern-completing, form-finding brains.
A major virtue of the NPH is that it does not need to characterise
this aspect of the learning process as one of ‘scaling up’ or
‘bootstrapping’; to do so is rightly to be accused of hand waving.21
For in this case the training ‘input’ is identical to learned ‘output’:
the structures to be acquired are clearly detectable in the
exemplars—the folk psychological narratives—themselves (this can
be seen by replacing the italicised mentalistic verbs in the ‘Red
Riding Hood’ excerpt with a series of neutral symbols). And it is
well known that connectionist networks can ‘learn’ both lexical
categories (e.g. nouns, verbs) and grammatical structures (e.g.
agreement and dependence of embedded clauses) using their
humble resources. In summarising the evidence on this score, Prinz
remarks that ‘Elman shows that a dumb pattern detector can pick
up on structural relations’.22 Note too that the folk psychological
template is a much simpler kind of structure than even the most
basic of syntactic patterns. All that is required in order to make the
NPH credible on this score is the assumption that the child’s world
is adequately populated with folk psychological narratives and that
they have enough opportunities to engage with them. This seems to
be the case, in most cultures.
It should also be recognised that although this framework is
derived from ambient stories, and is not part of a built-in theory,
this in no way detracts from the power and depth it affords in
making sense of others in particular cases. Its source does not affect
its capacity to ‘go beyond the evidence’ when explaining and
predicting what actors are likely to do in ‘novel’ cases (although, as
stressed, such third-personal uses are not a reliable method of
21 A. Gopnik, The Theory Theory as an Alternative to the Innateness
Hypothesis, Chomsky and His Critics, L. M. Antony and N. Hornstein
(eds.), 2003, 238–254, 243.
22 J. Prinz, Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 206.
Daniel D. Hutto
58
discovering another’s reasons for acting).23 Folk psychology
exhibits precisely the sorts of features that led philsosophers, such
as Lewis, to mark it out as being theory-like—i.e. it has
characteristics that makes the ‘theory theory’ a compelling
hypothesis.24 Nevertheless, despite having a coherent framework at
its core, folk psychology is not, in fact, theoretical in its origins or
principal applications.
It is worth saying a bit more about this. Many philosophers who
are attracted to theory theory are of the view that the content of
theoretical concepts is determined by the role they play in a
network of principles—principles which, when working in unison,
enable the prediction and explanation of action. It is also
commonly held that the ‘meanings’ of mental predicates, those
which form the basis of such principles, are fixed in the same way;
i.e. terms such as belief, desire and hope are defined by the way
they systematically interrelate with one another and with other
terms.
However, the claim that the meaning of mental predicates
depends wholly on their lawful relations is apparently undermined
by the fact that children develop a practical understanding of the
different propositional attitudes at distinct stages in their early
careers. Thus they have a grasp of the concept of desire, quite
independently of and prior to having an understanding of belief.
And an understanding of both of these attitudes appears to precede
an understanding of the roles they play in making sense of a
person’s reasons for action. At best, then, it seems that children
significantly extend their understanding of the core propositional
attitudes when they learn how these cooperate with one another
(and others of their ilk) in the context of reason explanations. It is
not that the later ability constitutes their understanding of mental
predicates. Nevertheless, it is getting to grips with the roles played
by the attitudes in this context that is, minimally, what is required
to be capable of understanding what it is to act for a reason.
23 The capacity to go beyond the evidence has been singled out as ‘the
most important evolutionary benefit of developing theorising abilities’ (A.
Gopnik and A. N. Meltzoff, Words, Thoughts, and Theories (Cambridge,
M.A.: MIT Press, 1996), 37). Good theories run deep: their power to
anticipate, explain and control stems from their tapping into the world of
the unseen and the abstract.
24 See D. Lewis, ‘How to Define Theoretical Terms’, Journal of
Philosophy 67, 1970, 427–446; D. Lewis ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical
Identifications’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50, 1978, 249–258.
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To be a practising folk psychlogist rests on having an
understanding of the roles that mentalistic concepts play in a
framework of this sort. Some have concluded, because of this, that
the framework in question is a theoretical one and mental
predicates thus have a theoretical status. But that is a mistake. It
may be an essential feature of all theories that they have complex
network structures—and it may even be that the meanings of
theoretical terms are determined entirely by the roles they play
within such networks (well, maybe). All of this could be true
without it being the case that folk psychology is a theory. Clearly,
the mere fact that something has a framework structure does not
entail that it is a theory or that the meaning of its concepts is
holistically constituted. Ordinary games, such as cricket or chess,
have rules, but these activities are not theoretically but convention-
ally grounded; they are well-established, regulated social practices.
Folk psychology, too, has a framework structure, but it is neither a
game nor a theory.
So, it looks like we should agree with holistically minded
theory-theorists only up to a point: in order to understand what it is
to act for a reason we must understand the roles played by the
mental predicates. But this gives us absolutely no reason to think of
such concepts as theoretical constructs—similar to ‘electrons’,
‘atoms’, or ‘gravity’. To be sure, to understand the distinct roles
that such concepts play in folk psychology requires having an
understanding of their place in a network of possibilities. But, at
most, this means that, in this context, mentalistic terms may be
similar in this one respect to certain theoretical terms (on the
disputable assumption that this is the best way to make sense of the
meaning of theoretical constructs). Folk psychology need be like a
theory in no other interesting aspect, neither in its origins nor its
primary applications.
For all these reasons, using the label ‘theory of mind’ as a byword
for folk psychological practice is highly misleading. The practice
should be shunned in light of the bad effects it has had (and
continues to have) on the imaginations of many philosophers,
psychologists and others working in this topic.
4. Norms of practical applicability
Successful application of folk psychology involves more than
merely getting to grips with its core structure, it requires
development of refined skill. One must be able to use it, sensitively,
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occasion by occasion. Encounters with folk psychological narratives
help foster this practical ability as well. For, although the structure
of intentional psychology is a constant in all folk psychological
narratives, they vary in other aspects. Through them children also
learn that many non-mentalistic factors are pertinent to why
someone has acted or might act. For example, they learn that what a
person believes or desires matters to the actions they take but also
how their character, unique history and circumstances might affect
their motivational set. These are the sorts of features, inter alia,
that differ from story to story, within a single story over time, and
often from protagonist to protagonist within the same story. They
are prominent in nearly all interesting stories even if only in the
background. Knowing how to make relevant adjustments to
accommodate just such factors is necessary for the skilled
application of folk psychology. The simplest person-narratives
engender this kind of practical knowledge by introducing children
to distinct characters and their specific background beliefs and
desires, particular agendas, unique histories, personality traits and
so on. Although the stories in which they figure are at first quite
simple, they become more sophisticated over time.
The main point, yet again, is that these stories have precisely the
right properties for familiarising children, not only with the core
mentalistic framework, but also with the rudimentary norms
governing its practical application. By putting examples of people
acting for reasons on display, they show both how the items in the
mentalistic toolkit can be used together to understand reasons in
general, as it were, but also how and when these tools might be
used—i.e. what to adjust for—in specific cases. They not only teach
children this but they also give some hints about how to make the
relevant adjustments (e.g. a character with suspicious tendencies is
likely to form certain beliefs in such and such a situation, etc.).
Encounters with such stories look ideally suited to provide children
with the requisite specialised know-how—i.e. to teach them how to
apply folk psychology, with sensitivity, in everyday contexts.
The NPH therefore has the potential to explain something its
rivals do not; insight into how we might acquire our workaday skills
in wielding folk psychology. This matters, for if an effective use of
folk psychology requires getting to grips with the sorts of factors
mentioned above, there is little to recommend the thought that such
‘practical worries’ can be shunted to one side and dismissed when it
comes to understanding FP abilities. Surprisingly, this is the
standard strategy. Thus, it is widely supposed that questions about
day-to-day ‘application’ can be relegated to the sideline and dealt
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with by a liberal invocation of ceteris paribus clauses. Consequently,
although everyone acknowledges that there are many factors—
psychological and non-psychological—that are relevant to any
particular attempt to make sense of an action in terms of reasons,
our ability to cope with these in practice is treated as if it is outside
the scope of folk psychology per se. The mainstream offerings,
theory theory and simulation theory, are conspicuously silent on the
question of what grounds this aspect of folk psychological practice.
To my eye, this is a serious lacuna.
Most theorists do not accept that there is a need to give an
account of such practical knowledge because they imagine, quite
wrongly in my opinion, that ‘folk psychology’ just is the name of a
theory or procedure; one which can be understood quite
independently from its practical application. I take the opposite
view: although folk psychology has a core framework—which can
be abstractly described as a set of principles—it is first and
foremost a practical enterprise. Its business just is the application of
a special narrative framework in specific cases of making sense of
actions. Any theory of folk psychology that fails to recognise and to
account for this will ultimately fail to satisfy. And this, I fear, is true
of all existing accounts.
Take theory theory as an example. Here the sole focus is on
explaining the nature of the basic rules of folk psychology—
understood in vacuo—those which define its core mentalistic
framework. Little attention is given to the question of how children
learn to apply these rules in practice. Rather it is often supposed
that we somehow rely on a tacit understanding of ‘idealised rational
agents’ when making mentalistic predictions and explanations.25
This is, so it is claimed, a necessary condition for getting any
mentalistic attribution off the ground. Thus, if I know that McX is
thirsty for a glass of water, and I know that he believes he could get
one by going downstairs to the refrigerator I will probably predict
that he will do just this (all else being equal and assuming he has
the right sort of background beliefs and desires, etc.). But I will
only expect this of McX if I think he will behave as any ‘rational
agent’ would. For if McX is irrational, interpreting or predicting
his behaviour in terms of his reasons is a non-starter.
25 Cf. D. C. Dennett, Brainstorms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1985), 16–22; D. C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1987), chapter 4; S. Stich, The Fragmentation of Reason
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), chapter 2, chapter 3.
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In one sense this is surely right. But knowing this is hardly
sufficient for being a practising folk psychologist; our everyday skill
involves much, much more than knowing in some thin, attenuated
sense that a person has acted or might act thus and so because they
have a certain belief/desire pairing and that they are not irrational.
Alone, knowing all of this would not be much help in making a
person’s actions intelligible. In those interesting cases in which we
might need to make sense of McX’s action we would need a much
thicker description not just of his psychological set, but of his
character, his history and his circumstances. In effect, we need to
know his particular story.
Sustained experience with folk psychological narratives primes
us for this richer practical understanding by giving us an initial
sense of: which kinds of background factors can matter, why they
do so, and how they do so in particular cases. Stories can do this
because they are not bare descriptions of current beliefs and desires
of idealised rational agents—they are snapshots of the adventures
of situated persons, presented in the kinds of settings in which all
of the important factors needed for understanding reasons are
described; those that are relevant to making sense of what is done
and why.
The various personae dramatis in such tales, even the not very
interesting ones, each have their own unique psychological profile
consisting not only of occurrent psychological attitudes but also
habitual tendencies or other personality traits (which may conflict
in various ways). They depict reasoners to be sure, but not ideal
ones. The principal players in narratives have substantial attributes;
these may make them admirable, pitiful or deeply or tragically
flawed. It is the knowledge that people too have such attributes—
learning what to watch out for and how to recognise these—that, in
large part, fuels the activity of making sense of their actions (and
indeed our own). This is at a far remove from making
generalisations about what we can expect that any rational
‘someone’ might do or might have done in specified circumstances.
Once again, this works because story characters, like their
real-life counterparts, do not pursue their projects in a vacuum.
Often their reasons for taking a particular course of action are
influenced by their character, larger projects, past choices, existing
commitments, ruling passions or unique circumstances and history.
My claim is that our ability to make sense of intentional action in
practice—and our proficiency at doing so—rests on our knowing in
general which details might be relevant and knowing how and when
to make the appropriate adjustments in particular cases. Folk
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psychological narratives are uniquely well-suited to foster this kind
of understanding because they provide examples of people acting
for reasons in appropriately rich settings.
Admittedly, a full and properly nuanced awareness of what is
involved in acting for a reason requires acquaintance with narratives
of a much more sophisticated kind than those that feature in
pre-school dialogues and simple fairy tales. There is much more on
offer in adult conversations and grander literary offerings. The
characters that populate children’s stories would struggle even to
pass muster as, what E.M. Foster called, ‘flat characters’; those who
‘can be summed up in a single sentence’.26 Typically, storybook
characters and the situations in which they find themselves are not
very complex. Little Red Riding Hood is no Madame Bovary, to be
sure. But this does not change the fact that such early narrative
encounters supply the basics needed for acquiring a first
understanding of reasons. This is folk psychology 101, after all, not
grad school.
I opened this paper by saying that it is a test of adequacy for any
good theory of folk psychology that it should be capable of
explaining (at least potentially) not just how we acquire an
understanding of the core mentalistic framework but also how we
acquire our normal capacity to apply it sensitively in practice. This
is integral to what we most want to understand about the distinctive
but everyday phenomenon of making sense of intentional actions; it
is not an optional extra. The importance of this can be best seen if
one considers that it is possible to learn about the core folk
psychological principles without knowing how or when to apply
them (or at least not with the same fluency that ordinary
practitioners of intentional psychology exhibit). One could learn
how the core mentalistic predicates relate to one another in
conceptual space without knowing, for example, how they function
in a richer setting i.e. without having any idea of how or when they
should be ascribed, as might happen if one learned such principles
by means other than by engaging with folk psychological narratives
in early childhood. Pretty clearly, on its own such an understanding
would be of limited value.
Let me be clear about one other aspect of the central claim of the
NPH. Although exposure to person-narratives is the normal route
for learning the forms and norms of folk psychology, it is possible
to achieve this (or something approximating to it) by other means.
Apparently, it is possible to learn the basic rules of folk psychology
26 Goldie, ibid, p. 3.
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off by heart, as some individuals, initially diagnosed with infantile
autism, have seemingly managed to do. The process is described as
a purely ‘logical one’, using observation to fashion a set of useable
generalizations that are then committed to memory, as are the
principles for their application. On this basis, autistic individuals
have been described as being able to ‘compute’ and ‘calculate’ what
others are thinking and feeling based on available evidence, as if
they were using a set of algorithms.27 This is achieved in later life,
perhaps thanks to their strong general intelligence and powerful
rote memories, in order to compensate for their lack of insight into
the reasons why others act. This is the most likely explanation of
how such individuals eventually become capable of passing false
belief tasks.
Picking up the relevant folk psychology principles and rules for
their application as sets of explicit regulations is quite unlike the
training I suggest is imparted through storytelling practice. And
the effects of this alternative kind of training regime are
transparent. Those who acquire their folk psychology skills in this
way remain quite awkward in their dealings with others; they never
fully develop a capacity to make sense of actions in the easy and
familiar way that most of us do.28 The phenomenological
differences are also salient.29 For example, Temple Grandin, an
autistic individual who has, by her own account, succeeded in
fashioning rules for understanding others in this way still ‘describes
herself as like an anthropologist on Mars’.30
Of course such feelings of estrangement have deeper roots, but
the point is that these persist even after autistic individuals learn to
master false belief tasks. This suggests that they never quite achieve
the kind of understanding of others that is the norm for most
27 See D. Bowler, ‘‘Theory of Mind’ in Asperger’s Syndrome’, Journal
of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 33, 1992, 877–893; S. Gallagher,
‘Understanding Interpersonal Problems in Autism: Interaction Theory as
an Alternative to Theory of Mind’, Philosophy, Psychiatry, Psychology 11,
2004, 199–217.
28 See R. Eisenmajer and M. Prior, ‘Cognitive Linguistics Correlates
of ‘Theory of Mind’ Ability in Autistic Children’, British Journal of
Developmental Psychology 9, 1991, 351–364; F. Happé, ‘The Role of Age
and Verbal Ability in the Theory of Mind Task Performance of Subjects
with Autism’, Child Development, 66, 1995, 843–855.
29 D. Zahavi and J. Parnas, ‘Conceptual Problems in Infantile Autism
Research’, Journal of Consciousness Studies 10, 2003, 53–71.
30 J. Kennett, ‘Autism, Empathy and Moral Agency’, The Philosophi-
cal Quarterly 52, 2002, 340–357.
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people. If nothing else, consideration of such cases should
discourage the tendency to think that folk psychology is nothing
more than the name for a theory or set of rules, as opposed to a
special sort of rule-based know how. This is a salient reminder that
our true explanandum, our real quarry, is a highly nuanced and
skilled practice—albeit one that makes use of the core mentalistic
framework.
Extracting this schema and becoming familiar with the norms for
its application through experience with a certain class of discursive
narratives is the culminating, non-negotiable requirement for a
basic mastery of our everyday folk psychology abilities. Engaging
in the relevant kind of story-telling practice is the normal route
through which this practical knowledge and understanding is
procured.
5. The myth of Jones (remixed)
But if this is right, what should we say about the ultimate origins of
our folk psychological abilities? Here I take a leaf out of Sellars’
book; both in making clear the limit of my ambitions while also
adapting the central feature of his basic proposal. Sellars concocted
a famous myth—which he explicitly identifies as a piece of
anthropological science fiction—in order to show the conditions
under which our Rylean ancestors—who would have been wedded
to a kind of methodological behaviorism—might have graduated to
a more non-observationally based understanding of ‘inner episodes
of thought’. This is accomplished, Sellars imagines, by a genius,
whom he calls Jones, who came amongst them. The great Jonesean
insight was to model the inner thoughts of his compatriots on their
overt speech acts and by doing so he developed a new means of
explaining their intelligent acts, even when these were unaccompa-
nied by any outward verbal behaviour.31
In the very same way, we can imagine that reasons—minimally,
logically interlaced belief/desire pairings—might have been origi-
nally modelled on overt narrations. These would have been
temporally extended, public speech acts that detailed, at bare
minimum, the episodes of practical reasoning that detailed one’s
rationale for acting. They would have provided accounts, for
example, of plans constructed and acted upon on the basis of
31 See W. Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956/1997), 102–107.
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manipulating propositional beliefs and desires in appropriate ways.
We can suppose then that just like the overt speech acts that served
as Jones’ original inspiration, these more complex narratives would
have been supplied by the authors of these activities, in the first
instance. Of course, this assumes that these narrators had
command of a logically complex natural language; since they would
have had to be at home with the practice of making plans based on
bouts of practical reasoning involving propositional attitudes,
expressing themselves in this way, and so on.
What matters is that in such story-tellings one’s reasons for
acting would have been put on exhibit for all to see. Presumably,
such narratives would have been public spectacles, taking the form
of complex third-personal representations for the benefit of a
shared audience—i.e. they would have been issued in second-
personal contexts. In short, we can imagine that such public
narrations would have provided the model for what it is to act for a
‘reason’ in just the same way that less complex utterances served
Jones in developing his understanding of inner episodes of
thought.32
The importance of this Sellarsian myth is that it serves to remind
us of the primacy of second-person, public practices in establishing
our understanding of ourselves and others as persons who act for
reasons. Given this ambition it may seem odd that I have borrowed
from Sellars. After all, he is frequently presented as an arch
theory-theorist, indeed possibly even the progenitor of the kind.
Surely, his myth is better suited to support the idea that, at its root,
folk psychology is a model used for third-personal explanation.
Indeed, it is common to hear that ‘Early formulations of the notion
of folk psychology stressed the idea that folk psychology is an
explanatory theory. This is much to the fore, for example, in Sellars’
32 Like Sellars, I do not want to elevate this suggestion beyond the
status of a myth in the sense that I make no claims about exactly how this
might have come about. But if we assume that the basic logic of this story
is right, it would seem that the practice of folk psychology is likely to have
emerged relatively late in the pre-history of our species. Even though we
do not know exactly when sophisticated linguistic abilities and the relevant
discursive practices might have emerged, it is a good bet that, ‘symbolic
language, with the central function of narrative making, emerged only
with Homo sapiens about thirty-five thousand years ago and was
accompanied by a rapid acceleration of cultural growth’. See K. Nelson,
‘Narrative and the Emergence of a Consciousness of Self’, Narrative and
Consciousness, G. D. Fireman, T. E. J. McVay and O. Flanagan (eds.)
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 24.
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influential mythical account of how folk psychology might have
emerged’.33 However, one really should not read too much into
Sellars’ talk of a Jones having created a ‘theory’, especially given
the source of his model. Certainly, the way the story plays out,
Jones uses his model in order to effect third-personal speculations.
And this is surely a possible use of folk psychology; though it is—to
be sure—not a very reliable one. Even so, this gives us no reason to
suppose that supporting such third-personal speculation is or was
the primary use of the folk psychological framework.
Even so, it might be objected, Sellars emphasizes the fact that the
way in which Jones constructs his model of non-observational
‘inner episodes of thought’ parallels the way in which theoretical
posits are, in general, constructed. But consider that he only ever
claimed that his ‘story helps us to understand that concepts
pertaining to such inner episodes are primarily and essentially
intersubjective, as intersubjective as the concept of a positron, and
that the reporting role of these concepts—the fact that each of us
has a privileged access to his thoughts—constitutes a dimension of
the use of these concepts which is built on and presupposes this
intersubjective status’.34 I too have been at pains to stress this
intersubjective, indeed socio-cultural, basis of our understanding
of reasons, but this hardly commits me—or anyone who follows
suit—to the idea that that understanding is theory-based,
theory-like or formed as a product of explicit theorizing.
To see this it may help if one observes that in my new version of
the Sellarsian myth, my Jones, like the orginal one, is not really a
creative mastermind; he is more an attentive listener. He pays close
attention to the stories of his fellow practical reasoners. For it is by
hearing these often enough (or, more plausibly, by actively
participating in conversations about these) that he becomes
acquainted with a basic understanding of what it is to act for a
reason. This would have supplied him with a framework that he can
apply again and again when making sense of actions performed for
reasons. My proposal is that the story is much the same with us.
33 Bermúdez, ibid., 47, emphasis added.
34 Sellars., ibid., 107, emphasis added.
Daniel D. Hutto
68
